Abstract-Mast of pre\ious research work in key management can only resist passive attacks, such as dropping the certificate request, and are vulnerable under active attacks, such as returning a fake reply to the node requesting the certification service. In this paper, we propose two algorithms to address both security and efficiency issues of certification services in ad hoc networks. Both of the algorithms can resist active attacks. In addition, simulation results show that, compared to the previous works, our second algorithm is not only much faster in a friendly environment, but it dso works well in a hostile environment in which existing schemes work poorly. Furthermore, the process of generating partial certificates in our second algorithm is extremely fast. Such advantage is critical in ad hoc networks where by nature lhe less help a node requests from its neighbors, the higher is the chance of obtaining the heIp. Consequently, using our second algorithm, a node can easily find enough neighboring nodes which provide the certification service.
I. Introduction
Among all the security issues in ad hoc networks, key management is the most crucial one, because it is the essential assumption of many other security services. For instance, many secure routing protocols, such as ARAN [I] and SRP 121, assume that a pair of private and public keys and a certificate signed by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) have been assigned to nodes. One core problem of key management in ad hoc networks is how to provide certification services securely. Most of previous research work mainly focused on passive attacks, such as dropping the certificate request, and are inefficient under cases that malicious nodes launch active attacks, such as returning a fake reply to the node requesting the certification service. However, active attacks may result in great risks, especially in the military field. Due to the poor physical security in ad hoc networks, adversaries may take over some nodes in the network. By launching active 0-7803-8991-3/05/$20.00 0 2005 IEEE attacks, adversaries can disable the certification service of the whole network without being caught, with only a very small portion of nodes.
To overcome these challenges, we propose two algorithms based on threshold cryptography and Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) to address both security and efficiency issues of certification services in ad hoc networks. Both of the two algorithms can resist active attacks on certification services in ad hoc networks. Simulation results show that, compared to the previous works 131, [4] , our second algorithm is not only much faster in a friendly environment, but it also works we11 in a hostile environment in which existing schemes work poorly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I1 studies the related work in the literature. After introducing some cryptographical primitives in Section III, in Section IV, we present the system model of our algorithms. Certification services and secret share updates are presented in Section V and Section VI, respectively.
Simulation results on the security and efficiency of our scheme are given in Section VII. In Section VIII, we draw the conclusions.
II. Related Work
In [ 5 ] , Zhou and Haas focused on how to establish a secure key management service in an ad hoc networking environment. They proposed to use threshold cryptography 161, [7] to distribute trust among a set of servers. The focus of their work is to maximize the security of the shared secret in the presence of possible compromises of the secret share holders. It assumes a small group of servers with rich connectivity. Therefore, it is not suitable for purely ad hoc environments.
In 
Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we briefly describe various cryptographic techniques underlying our approach.
A. Secret Sharing
The first secret sharing scheme was proposed by Shamir in 1979 [ll] . This scheme is also called a (n, IC)-fhreshold scheme, since it has the following properties:
(1) any k or more users can reconstruct the secret from their shares; (2) for k -1 or fewer users, it is impossible to reconstruct the secret. The integer k is called the threshold.
B. Proactive Security
A proactive threshold cryptography scheme [ 121-1141 uses share refreshing, which enabies users to compute new shares from old ones in collaboration without disclosing the service' private key, i.e. the shared secret, to any user. The new shares constitute a new (n, k) sharing of the service private key. After refreshing, users remove the old shares and only keep the new ones. Because the new shares are independent of the old ones, the adversary cannot combine old shares with new shares to recover the private key of the service. Thus, the adversary is challenged to compromise k users between periodic refreshing s.
C. Verifiable Secret Sharing Schemes
There are two weaknesses in the Shamir secret sharing scheme: (1)If the dealer distributes erroneous subshares to some or all the users, how can users verify whether the subshares received are correct? (2)Dunng the share recovery process, if some compromised users provide false subshares, how can other users detect them?
Share refreshing must tolerate missing subshares and erroneous subshares from compromised users. A compromised user may not send any subshares. However, as long as correct users agree on the set of subshares to use, they can generate new shares using only subshares generated from k users in a (n, k) secret sharing scheme. To detect incorrect subshares, a few VSS schemes were proposed in [12], [l5] . A VSS scheme generates extra public information for each (sub)share using a one-way function. The public information can testify the correctness of the corresponding (sublshares without disclosing them.
IV. System Model
Before providing the certification service, the secret key of the whole ad hoc network has been securely shared by all the members in the network using a (n, k) secret sharing scheme. Namely, only k or more nodes can jointly recover the secret key. And besides a share of the secret key, each node has a personal PKI key pair. The key pair can be generated by either a TTP or even the node itself.
A. Notation and Assumptions
In the rest of this paper, we use the following notations:
[ S K , P K ] : the secret and public key pair of the whole ad hoc network. PK is known by all the nodes. a secret share of S K , which is held by node the personal secret and public key pair S K I :
ID*: the identifier of node "i".
certi: a statement consisting of the association between node i and its public key and the expired time.
CERTi: the certificate of node "7'. It is a signature on the statement certi using SK.
We make the following assumptions in this paper: 1) Each node i has a personal PIU key pair b k i , s k i ] .
2) Given the public key of any node, it is computationally infeasible to obtain the corresponding secret key. 3) Between any two consecutive secret share updates, the number of adversaries that hold secret shares originating from SK is less than k. Adversaries may still stay in the network,.or have already left it. of node '7''.
B. Types of Attacks on Certification Services
In this paper, we consider two types of possible attacks on certification services in ad hoc networks: passive attacks and active attacks. In passive attacks, adversaries simply drop and refuse to forward other nodes' requests of assigning or renewing Certificates. In active attacks, in contrast, adversaries may return a fake reply (namely, an invalid partial certificate) to the node requesting certification services. In [3], [4], Kong et al. proposed two algorithms to prevent passive attacks. However, their algorithms are vulnerable to active attacks. SpecificalIy, if any partial certificate returned to the requesting node is invalid, although the requesting node can detect that the combined certificate is invalid, it cannot figure out which partial certificates are invalid. Consequently, the current process fails, and all the computation done are wasted.
The node has to restart the process by selecting k partial certificates again. Simulation results in Section VI1 shows that the success rate of completing the certification service in their algorithms drops very fast when the threshold of the network increases. Accordingly, the number of rounds for completing the certification service increase rapidly when the threshold of the network increases. Here, one round is defined to be the whole procedure that begins from a node requesting to be assigned a new certificate or renew its certificate to the combination and validation process of certificates assigned or renewed. Firstly, node i chooses a group of 2k -1 nodes from its neighbors. Without loss of generality, let the. group be G = (1,. . a , 2 k -1 ) . Then node i broadcasts the request m together with the IDS of the 2k-1 nodes among the group G. To achieve VSS, we need to generate a random shared secret denoted as r within group G. Details is shown as follows. After performing these steps, the following equations hold:
V. Certificate Initialization and Renewal
where at = CjEHo ujt, for t f I, * . a , k -1, and f(j) = e j (mod q ) for J E Ho.
In [19] , the above scheme is proved to be robust under the assumption that k 5 5. In ad hoc networks, such assumption is reasonable, since normally the threshold is set to be much less than the number of of nodes in the whole network. Then for each node j E Ho, reveals its partial certificate:
and yj can be verified by:
where Ct = gat, for all j E Ho. 
B. Assigning certificates based on k nodes
Although the algorithm presented Section V-A can complete the certification service within one round, the computation overhead for achieving VSS is heavy for nodes in ad hoc networks. To solve this problem, in this section we propose another algorithm which requires lightweight computation. This algorithm needs cooperations from only k nodes, but it may take more than one round to assign a certificate, when malicious nodes are launching active attacks. Although this algorithm is not fault-tolerant, we can distinguish honest and malicious Once a node j E G receives the request and decides to serve the request, it first chooses a random integer e3 E Z, and broadcasts z j = gej (mod p) and PKj = gs'<? (mod p) within the group G. Then node j calculates its partial certificate rj that is specific to group G In practice, node i can h t verify (X, a) using Eq. (4). If it is valid, the task is completed. Otherwise, node i then verifies the partial certificates using Eq. (3). Those adversaries providing invalid partial certificates are detected at this stage.
VI, Scalable Share Updates
Although adversaries are not able to compromise k or more nodes at the same time, the number of nodes compromised may increase gradually. Therefore, to prevent the secret key of the network from being disclosed, we need to update the shares of the secret key periodically. To ensure the security of share updates, we employ proactive secret sharing schemes [12]-[.14], C201 to adapt the configuration of the secret sharing to variations in highly dynamic environments, such as ad hoc networks. The proactive threshold cryptography scheme enables nodes in the network to compute new shares from old ones in collaboration without discIosing SK. It relies on the homomorphic property.
We notice that it is unnecessary to require all the nodes involved in the share refreshing process. Instead, the task can be done by only k nodes, since we assume that, between any two consecutive secret share updates, the number of adversaries which hold secret shares originating from the same secret key is less than k. The new shares constitute a new (n, k) sharing of the service secret key. After refreshing, nodes remove the old shares and use the new ones to generate partial signatures. Because the new shares are independent of the old ones, the adversary cannot combine old shares with new shares to recover the secret key of the service.
Thus, the adversary is challenged to compromise k nodes between periodic refreshing.
VII. Simulations on Security and Efficiency
Current on-demand routing protocols, such as AODV 1211 and OLSR [22], handle well when the size of an ad hoc network is around I00 to 250 nodes. Thus, we set the network size within this range in our simulation. Let p,, be the probability of a node being compromised, p t be the probability of SK being compromised, and n be the size of the network. Table I shows the settings on the threshold under different conditions. For example, when pR is not less than 0.01, to ensure pr lower than 1w4, the threshold should be set to at least 7 and 11 for an ad hoc network with 100 and 250 nodes, respectively. As shown in Figure I , the total time for generating or renewing a certificate in our second algorithm varies from 20 to 250 milliseconds in the experiments, depending on the setting on the key length, threshold, and region size. In particular, when the key length is 1024 bits, it takes our second algorithm around 40 to 70 milliseconds to generate or renew a cehcate. We also find that, in our second algorithm, the process that a neighbor Figure 3 and Figure 4 , we show the ratio of the total time for generating or renewing a certificate in Kong's algorithm to that of our second algorithm and the ratio of the time for generating a partial certificate in Kong's algorithm to that of our second algorithm, respectively. As shown in Figure 3 , our second algorithm is more efficient, when we consider the total time for assigning a new certificate. For instance, when the key length is 1024 bits, our second algorithm is around six to eight times faster 
Algorithm to That of Our Second Algorirhm
Ratio of ?me for Generating A Partial Certificate in Kong tion renewals within two rounds and the average rounds of retries before successfully assigning or renewing a certificate as the evaluation metrics.
We run the simulations in a 6OOm X 600m network with 100 or 250 nodes, and the speed of nodes ranges from 1 d s to 20 mls. We apply the random way-point model to emulate node mobility pattern.
As shown in Figure 5 , the success rate of 131, [4] declines very quickly when the threshold increases. For example, for a network with size 100 and p , is 0.01, if the threshold is set to be 5, the success rate is 83.41%. However, if the threshold increases to 10, the success rate drops to 40.59%.
show the average retries of certification renewals in [3], [4] and our scheme. In the former, the number of average retries is very sensitive to the increment of the threshold. h contrast, in our scheme, the average number of retries is very stable and only around 2. Figure 6 than Kong's algorithm. As to the process of generating a. partial certificate, the efficiency is greatly improved in our second algorithm. For example, when the key length is 1024 bits, our second algorithm is around 20 to 80 times faster. Consequently, using our second algorithm, a node can easily find enough neighboring nodes to provide the certification service, since very little effort is involved.
From empirical results, we notice that the performance of our algorithm is tightly related to the key length and the threshold. The larger the key length is, the more time we need to complete the certification service. However, compared to Kong et al.'s scheme, our second scheme is less sensitive to this parameter, and thus is more efficient. Similarly, the larger the threshold is, the more time we need to complete the certification service.
B. Certification Senices Under Active Attacks
To compare the efficiency of certification services under active attacks, we use the success rate of ceaifica- 
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed two algorithms based on threshold cryptography and VSS to address both security and efficiency issues of certification services in ad hoc networks. Both of the two algorithms can resist active attacks. In addition, simulation results show that, compared to the previous works, our second algorithm is not only much faster in a friendly environment, but it also works well in a hostile environment in which existing schemes work poorly. Besides that, using our second algorithm, a node can easily find enough neighboring nodes which provide the certification service.
